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Abstract:  
The originality of Marx’s Capital is often underestimated.  Countless 
commentaries have appeared, but only a few have taken the full measure of 
Capital’s truly unique and counter-intuitive outlook.  Critics generally assume 
that Marx was pursuing familiar questions of economics or philosophy in a 
fresh way – that his aim was to explain profits, history, or ontology.  Those 
goals were indeed part of his mission.  But Marx’s wish to revolutionize 
society ran deeper than most commentators have realized.  His goal was 
not just socialism or a classless society but, even more profoundly, a post-
commercial society in which self-emancipated workers associate freely to 
share what they make, rather than producing for sale. He envisioned a 
society entirely free of commerce, in which products cease to be 
commodities and become freely shared goods that satisfy human needs 
directly, without facing daunting obstacles of cost and affordability.  
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Visions of this kind are ordinarily called utopian.   And despite Marx’s 
reputation for radicalism – his standing, in the immortal words of Jimmy 
Carter, as “the grand daddy of Communism”1 – his utopianism is rarely fully 
appreciated. Several factors have contributed to this result.  Not least is the 
fact that Marx’s name and ideas were coopted by parties that sought, and 
won, state power. These parties portrayed Marx as an advocate of 
centralized planning, and they had the resources to give this claim the 
veneer of orthodoxy. Marx’s actual vision of a society with neither exchange 
nor an executive branch of government was neglected.2 Another barrier to 
insight is the assumption that Marx’s agenda can be found mainly in his 
political writings.  In fact, the deepest roots of his thought appear in Capital, 
where Marx not only “theorizes” value but opposes it, with utopian 
implications. To clarify this point, which Marx explains awkwardly, I offer a 
fresh account of his core argument. 
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Few books are as iconic as Das Kapital.  From Einstein to Eisenstein, from 
Simmel to Simiand, writers across the spectrum have echoed and extended 
Marx in countless ways.3 Sociological studies arrived early4 and were 
followed by films, plays, cartoon guides, museum exhibits, algebra, and 
even poetry about value and its vicissitudes.5 Innumerable criticisms and 
catechisms have appeared.  Many of these works are pedestrian but some 
enlivening flowers have bloomed as well:  semiotic and psychoanalytic 
readings, aesthetic and literary criticism, surrealist and situationist critiques 
of the commodity 'spectacle', investigations by feminist anthropologists and 
philosophers, and much else of interest.6 Yet Capital is still more often cited 
than intensively studied, and Marx’s core concepts remain difficult even for 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 




careful and astute readers.  
Paul Lafargue pointed out the disparity between Marx’s celebrity 
and Capital’s neglect as early as 1884, writing to Engels from France: “Marx's 
name penetrates everywhere at the moment; people bow to his knowledge, 
his 'steely' logic, even when they have not read a line of Marx.”7 So swiftly did 
Marx’s renown spread, amid the tumultuous growth of the socialist 
movement, that Capital was soon known as the Bible of the working 
class.  Yet by 1908 Rosa Luxemburg was already warning that Capital was 
honored more as a symbol than as a guide.  “The splendid weapon is 
rusting,” she wrote.  Few of her socialist colleagues had studied Capital, and 
others had already begun to call Marx passé.  “It is not true,” she insisted, 
that Capital “is out-of date, that we have superseded Marx.”8 And yet even 
Luxemburg discounted the pertinence of Marx’s argument, in Volume 3 of 
Capital (1894), that profit rates tend to fall even as the mass of profit rises 
prodigiously, and that this “falling tendency of the profit rate” may yet prove 
to be capitalism’s Achilles heel.9 
Isaac Deutscher, the eminent Marxist historian, first attempted to 
read Capital in the 1930s.  He was well aware of the challenge he faced.  As 
Marx had written to his publisher, Maurice Lachâtre, in the letter that 
prefaces the French edition of Capital, “There is no royal road to science, 
and only those who do not fear the arduous climb up its steep paths will 
have a chance of reaching its luminous summits.”10 In a memoir written to 
honor Capital’s centennial in 1967, Deutscher admitted that he had initially 
found Capital daunting: “I wondered whether Marx had not made those 
pathways just a little too steep...”: 
 
His exposition seemed to me too slow and leisurely for someone … 
impatient to understand the world and to change it quickly.  I was 
relieved to hear that Ignacy Daszynski, our famous Member of 
Parliament, a pioneer of socialism, …admitted that he too found Das 
Kapital too hard a nut.  'I have not read it,' he almost boasted, 'but 
Karl Kautsky has read it and has written a popular summary of it.  I 
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have not read Kautsky either, but Kelles-Krauz, our party theorist, 
has read him and he summarized Kautsky's book.  I have not read 
Kelles-Krauz either; but the clever Jew, Herman Diamond, our 
financial expert, has read Kelles-Krauz, and has told me all about it.11 
  
The great Daszynski had the merit of candor, if not of scholarship.  And so 
too does Thomas Piketty.  In his best-seller Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century (2014), Piketty echoed Marx’s language without reading his actual 
words.  He was asked by an interviewer: “Can you talk a little bit about the 
effect of Marx on your thinking and how you came to start reading 
him?”  Piketty: “Marx?” Interviewer: “Yeah.”  Piketty: “I never managed really 
to read it.  I mean, I don’t know if you’ve tried to read it.  Have you tried?”12 
Ironically, in today’s ultra-gilded age, Capital is now becoming an 
unread status symbol for wealthy art collectors who want the cachet of 
social consciousness.  One of the keynotes of the Venice Biennale 
international art exhibition in 2015 was a daily reading of Capital – lasting 
seven months! – by a performing team under the direction of the avant 
garde film-maker Isaac Julien.  The inspiration for this effort came from the 
Biennale’s 2015 director, Okwui Enwezor, who called Capital a text “nobody 
has read and yet everyone hates or quotes from.”13  
Failing to read Capital is one thing.  But reading Capital and falling 
short of full comprehension is entirely honorable.  Many people have 
suffered that fate, and much of the fault lies with Marx – whose writing could 
be thick-tongued and clotted, obscuring rather than illuminating the strength 
and uniqueness of his thought. 
  
The Educator Must Also be Educated 
  
Marx was never a teacher.  That simple fact explains in part why Capital is 
often so difficult. Unlike many other seminal thinkers – like Émile Durkheim, 
who was a teacher to his fingertips, or Rosa Luxemburg, who often taught 
courses in Social Democratic Party schools – Marx was rarely called upon 
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to explain his ideas out loud.  Nowhere was that significant fact more 
evident, or fateful, than in Capital.  
Aside from a lecture to the General Council of the International 
Workingman’s Association which his daughter Eleanor Marx entitled “Value, 
Price and Profit,”14 Marx confined his educational mission to Capital (1867, 
1872, 1875) and to the volume that preceded it, Zur Kritik der politischen 
Ökonomie (1859).15 His prose in these texts is often magnificent – 
symphonic, cogent, full of passion and precision.  But his writing can also be 
laboured and leaden, and he often misjudged the difficulty of his subject 
and the capacity of his audience.  
In his original outline of Vol. 1 of Capital, Marx neglected to include 
a special section on what proved to be his thorniest subject, “the 
appearance-form of value.”16 He assumed that the concept was self-
explanatory; and even after Engels persuaded him to explain his thinking 
more fully, he was still reluctant to put this explanation in the main 
text.  Instead, he attached an appendix.  Not until the second German 
edition in 1872 did Marx relent and place “The Value-Form, or Exchange 
Value” in what is now its familiar position in Chapter 1, “The Commodity.”17  
It was also in 1872 that Marx first explained his notion of commodity 
fetishism at some length.18  He had said in the 1867 edition that the uncanny 
duality of the commodity inspires “metaphysical subtleties and theological 
fancies,” but he had evidently underestimated the extent to which his own 
readers would fall prey to these subtleties and fancies.19 When, in 1881, Marx 
wrote an extended critique of an attempt to interpret and refute Capital by a 
mainstream economist, he expressed frustration over the failure of 
academic economists to fathom his vocabulary.  But the truth was that 
academics were not alone in their confusion, and that Marx’s vocabulary 
was, in fact, problematic. 
Many critics fault Marx for his dialectical style.  I regard that as one 
of his strengths.  The commodity is the unity of two opposed principles, 
value and use, not because Marx read Hegel, but in reality.  I would argue 
that the problem with Marx’s vocabulary lies in his uncritical embrace of the 
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language of political economy, not in his philosophical premises.  He 
obviously wanted to coin as few new terms as possible.  But attempting to 
construct a demystifying vocabulary with inherited terms like “value,” “use-
value” and “exchange-value” and invented phrases like “value-form,” “value-
substance,” and “value-magnitude” was not a recipe for intelligibility.  The 
word “value” appears as the denominator of every other core concept.  This 
perseverating repetition would have been confusing even if Marx had been 
perfectly lucid about the distinctions between his terms – which he was not. 
In 1975, when I began to study Capital as a first-year graduate 
student, I was looking for the errors that my undergraduate economics 
teachers had told me rendered Capital obsolete.  Several of these teachers 
belonged to the Union of Radical Political Economists and saw themselves 
as Marxists.  But they agreed with their non-Marxist colleagues that Marx’s 
core value concepts were naively Hegelian.  The good news, they said, was 
that the superstructure of Marx’s theory – class, capital exploitation – was 
sociologically valid.  I had already begun to write about capital and class so 
I found this perspective congenial.20 But, since I was also drawn to Capital’s 
value-logic, I was perplexed.  I was still a raw beginner, and I was open to 
the premise that the critical theory of the future would sail from harbors 
other than Capital.   But a simple question remained unclear to me:  Was 
Capital actually wrong?  
To see for myself I annotated Chapter 1 of Capital word for word, 
day after day, for a year, searching for Marx’s fundamental error.  Decades 
later I still haven’t found it.  I’ve now been immersed in Capital and Marx’s 
ancillary texts for a long time, and I always find them profound and 
convincing.21 I find it jarring to set Capital aside to read lesser works.  But I’ve 
also taught Capital for decades, and I know from experience that readers 
find his terminology confusing.  So, in what follows, I attempt to explain 
Marx’s ABCs in a fresh way.  My goal is not to reproduce every nuance of 
Chapter 1 but to capture Marx’s enduring, essential logic. 
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The ABC’s in a Nutshell 
 
What Marx offers us, most fundamentally, is a theory of the 
commodity.  Labour products are found in every age, but they become 
“commodities” only at the point in history when they are produced for 
exchange rather than for immediate use. Early commodity exchange takes 
the form of barter, in which one commodity trades for another.  Ultimately, 
as exchange becomes increasingly widespread, at least one commodity 
acquires the status of money and becomes acceptable in exchange for 
every other commodity.  Barter thus gives way to buying and selling.   
Gold is the classic money commodity, but there have been others 
as well.  When money is used to hire workers and buy materials and 
equipment to produce commodities, it functions as capital. 
Use and price are the most immediately obvious attributes of the 
commodity.  Usefulness is uncomplicated, the immediate consequence of 
the product’s material properties.  But price, upon closer inspection, proves 
to be a riddle wrapped in an enigma.  Only in commercial societies do 
products even have prices; and the vital question, Marx says, is why they 
have prices, and what this means.  
How is it even possible for physically unlike things to trade as 
equivalents?   How does it happen that dissimilar products can have 
identical prices?  The answers to these questions, Marx, says, lie in practice 
– the fact that, in exchange, dissimilar things are “forcibly equated.”  They are 
“treated and regarded” as if they are alike – and, as a result, they function as 
equivalents.  
In other words, we can say that commodities are socially alike, 
even though they differ materially.  All commodities are for sale and all have 
prices. But why do those prices differ?  Why is one product expensive while 
another is inexpensive?  The answer to that question revolves around two 
principles, one essential and another contingent.  The essential principle is 
the amount of labour that goes into the product.  Under normal conditions, 
labour-intensive products are expensive and other products are less 
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expensive.  But labour is not the only source of price.  A second, empirical 
principle thus applies as well – “supply and demand.”  The empirical price 
for a given product at any moment reflects the joint influence of two factors 
– labour, and the balance of supply and demand.  
These two factors are not equally influential.  Consider the 
hypothetical case in which Products A and B appear in identical quantities 
and the demand for each exactly matches the supply:  20,000 units are 
produced and exactly 20,000 are purchased, with no left over demand.  Will 
these two products have the same price?  Seldom, if ever.   
Let’s say that Product A is the world’s highest priced car -- which, in 
2017, is the CCXR Trevita, available for $4.8 million.  Product B, meanwhile, is 
a novelty t-shirt featuring an image of the CCXR Trevita, priced at 
$18.99.  Supply and demand are identical for the car and the t-shirt and they 
balance exactly for each of them.  Yet their prices are not remotely 
similar.  That difference, Marx says, reflects the fact that the principle which 
anchors price is labour – the time and energy which typically goes into the 
product.  Even if demand were to fall sharply for the Trevita, or rise sharply 
for the t-shirt, there is almost no realistic scenario in which their prices could 
converge.  They differ, irreconcilably, in the dimension of labour. 
Labour, meanwhile, is also complex.  Marx says that the pivot, the 
very Springpunkt of his theory is the contention that the labour that enters 
into price calculations is different in principle from the labour that affects the 
product’s uses.  That claim may seem counter-intuitive at first hearing, but 
Marx simply means that the price of the product is normally calculated in an 
impersonal way.  Say that on Day 1 you spend 11 hours and 15 minutes 
making a basket.  On Day 2 you spend 25 fewer minutes making a nearly 
identical basket.  Those days actually happened; the labour was physical, 
arduous, and yours.  Marx calls that labour personal, natural, 
concrete.  Now, say you take those baskets to the market, where you find 
that other producers averaged just 5.5 hours to make baskets that are 
indistinguishable from yours.  Will you be able to sell your baskets for twice 
as much as they charge, or more, simply because you took longer to make 
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your baskets?  Will you be able to sell your look-alike baskets for two 
different prices?  
The likeliest real-world answer to these questions is No.  What 
counts, in the market, is how long it takes to make a commodity on 
average.  Rarely will anyone know or care how much time and effort you put 
into your basket.  It’s sad but true that, for price calculations, those concrete 
personal details are irrelevant. What matters instead is the average, amount 
of anonymous labour that goes into a typical product – in this case, a 
basket. Marx calls that labour abstract, social, anonymous. Such labour, 
which exists not in the use of the commodity but in its price, contains “not 
an atom of matter.”  It is socially real but materially “ghostly.” 
Concrete labour alters the “natural form” of the commodity, 
enhancing the material properties that make it useful.  But the material 
specifics of this labour are disregarded when price calculations are 
made.  Weaving and tailoring are treated as if they were simply “labour” 
without any unique, distinguishing features.  No other, new labour is 
performed; actual labour, performed by a particular person, can only be 
concrete.  But the market “treats and regards” each specific instance of 
concrete labour as if it were simply an average quantity of generic 
labour.  The act of trading the product for another product forcibly equates 
not only the two products but the labour that produced them.   
In this way, the action of exchange entails abstraction from the 
particularities of the two different forms of labour that enter into the 
products.  This is the sense in which commodity-producing labour is 
abstract.  We confront an abstractness that appears only in price, in an 
abstract quantity, in a number. Usefulness is concrete, never abstract.  Price, 
in contrast, is impersonal rather than personal; social, not material.  
It is also important to note that, even in quantity, abstract labour can 
change after the concrete labour of producing the commodity is 
completed.  Of course, the quantity of actual physical labour cannot change 
retroactively, but the quantity of abstract labour often does just 
that.  Suppose, for example, that you plan to sell 24 baskets next month that 
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you just spent four weeks making.  You know how the market works.  You 
know that with current methods each basket takes an average of five hours 
to make, so that, if you were to sell your baskets today, you would receive a 
price equivalent to five hours of abstract labour for each of them (even 
though you did not work exactly five hours on each basket, and give or take 
minor price deviations caused by fluctuations of supply and 
demand).  Today, your 24 baskets are worth the equivalent of 120 hours of 
abstract labour.  But suppose that a manufacturer who has secretly 
invented a basket-making machine surprises you tomorrow by arriving on 
the scene with 100 machine-made baskets, each of which took only 15 
minutes to produce.  That fact would dramatically reduces the amount of 
“average” time it takes to make a basket.  The net result would be that your 
baskets will suddenly sell for a much less than before, even though the total 
amount of concrete work you put into them is unchanged.  
Abstract labour, in short, is the underlying reality of what Marx calls 
“the world of commodities” (die Waarenwelt).  This is the peculiar world 
where prices come first, where we must buy products before we can use 
them.  In this world, Marx knows, people do not ordinarily see “abstract 
labour.”  Nor do we usually perceive that products sell in proportion to the 
amount of average labour they contain.  That may be the truth.  If Marx is 
right, abstract labour is, in fact, the “social substance” of the commodity, the 
principle underlying trade.  But that is not what people ordinarily see in the 
course of commodity production.   
What do they see?  According to Marx, in developed commodity 
production, with money as the commodity equivalent to all others, people 
see price.  Bar codes, price tags and money are ubiquitous.  Abstract labour 
is the secret behind this surface, but the surface is what we normally see – 
and that surface is price.  What producers want to know is not how to define 
price but what price their products will bring.  How much are our products 
worth?  What equivalent will we get for them?   
The essential reality, Marx says, is the fact that concrete labour is 
treated and regarded as abstract.  The empirical reality, the reality we see 
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and calculate, is price. This is what Marx means when he calls price the 
“appearance form” (Erscheinungsform) of abstract labor.  We see abstract 
labour not directly but in the form of money.  In pre-monetary barter 
something similar applies, but in this instance, rather than seeing money 
price, people see what we can call barter price.  This is the commodity’s 
price in the form, not of money, but of another commodity, which Marx calls 
a “particular equivalent commodity.” 
In all this, and in his language of “representation” and “appearance” in 
general, Marx is talking about one thing only – how abstract labour appears 
to people.  In 1867, in the first German edition of Capital, he uses the apt 
phrase “thought-form” to make this point.  And the “thought” he posits is not 
academic but pragmatic, socially real in everyday practice.  
Marx illustrates this point by analysing the “relative” and “equivalent” 
standpoints of the participants in an exchange.  In his best-known example, 
he analyses the exchange of linen, produced by a weaver, for a coat, 
producd by a tailor.  The actors in this exchange – which happens to be an 
episode of barter – are the weaver and the tailor.  Marx’s point is that their 
exchange can be viewed from both standpoints.  Imagine, to start with, that 
you are the weaver.  By Marx’s logic, that means that you occupy the 
“relative” position in the exchange.  Your fate and the linen’s fate are 
entwined; and since your intent in weaving the linen was to obtain an 
equivalent in exchange, you want to know what counts as an equivalent.  In 
other words, what’s your linen worth?   
If you pose this question existentially, you could conclude, á la 
Marx, that your linen is a unit of abstract labour.  Or, like most people, you 
could pose this question pragmatically – and your answer is likely to be 
equally pragmatic.  Since, at going rates, your 20 yards of your linen is worth 
exactly one coat, the answer to your question is straightforward – your linen 
is worth one coat.  The coat, itself, is the “form” in which the abstract labour 
contained in your product appears to you. 
The same principle applies to the tailor.  From her standpoint, she is 
the owner of the relative commodity.  This is because producers are always 
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relative commodity owners to themselves.  The owner of the equivalent 
commodity is always the other party to the exchange.  Given this premise, 
the form in which the abstract labor in the coat appears to the tailor is 
plain.  It is, very simply, the weaver’s 20 yards of linen.   
In short, abstract labour always appears to the owner of the relative 
commodity in the form of the equivalent commodity.  That means that 
abstract labour always takes the form of price – either barter price, when the 
equivalent is another single commodity, or money price, when money 
becomes the universal equivalent.  Producers normally see the social 
essence of the commodity either in the physical form of a particular 
equivalent or in money.  That form, price, is not only visible but unmistakably 
and overwhelmingly powerful.  We thrive to the extent that we sell our 
commodities (including, for most of us, our ability to work) for decent 
prices.  If we fail in that effort, we suffer real consequences.   
Price, meanwhile, seems to be intrinsic to the product itself.  It is 
beyond our control.  As the commodity’s social truth, price is independent of 
our personal wishes.  It is a truth which only exchange can reveal to us.  It is 
in this sense that our products, as commodities, have a “fetish 
character.”  Like religious fetishes, commodities spring from human 
effort.   That is what the word “fetish” originally denoted – something made 
by hand.  Commodities, like fetishes, are made by hand, by concrete 
labour.  But since the fate of the commodity in exchange is determined by 
calculations of abstract labour – by considerations of “average” behind-the-
scenes effort – we typically envision the price of the product as a power 
governing us.  The product, which we ourselves make, determines our fate – 
thanks to its price. 
The commodity’s fetish character is thus a function of its two-sided 
character.  Materially the product does not rule or mystify us.  We are 
mystified and governed, rather, by the product’s social status as a bearer of 
price.  That price is a kind of force field, enveloping the product and blocking 
our access to it.  We can only obtain the product’s use if we pay its price; 
and most of us, as wage earners, can only pay the price if we sell our ability 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 




to work.  Hence people go hungry for lack of money.  They suffer because, 
though capable of concrete labor, no employer wants to buy that capacity 
or to pay for it generously.  
For Marx, the fetish-character of the commodity is a travesty – a 
tragedy.  What he wants, most fundamentally, is to roll back the price-side of 
the product.  Products with prices are products for sale; and Marx believes 
that people should share, not sell, what they make.  Price should be 
abolished, emancipating use. 
This argument is far more radical than Marx’s critics and disciples 
ordinarily imagine.  Most of them assume that his aims were anti-capitalist. 
That is certainly true – but it captures only part of Marx’s intent.  Capital is 
only part of the problem, since the deeper problem is the commodity 
itself.  In several places – in his comments on Gray, Darimon and Proudhon 
in the Grundrisse (1857-58) and Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1859) – 
Marx stresses that even the radical abolition of money, to create a 
“democracy of commodity producers,” would be a half-measure. 
Commodity production evolves.  Any society freed of money but founded on 
exchange would almost certainly evolve money again; and money, at some 
point, would once again function as capital.22  
Marx’s solution is thus simpler and more radical than people 
ordinarily think:  to abolish price in every form, including not only the money 
form but the barter form favored by Proudhon.  Concrete labour should not 
be rendered abstract.  
  
The ABC’s in Perspective 
 
The summary above condenses what I take to be Marx’s core argument into 
2,500 words.  The formal novelty of this summary is that I interpret Marx 
entirely without using the language of “value.”  I omit all cognate terms 
(“use-value” and “exchange-value,” “value-form” and “value-substance,” 
“value-magnitude,” etc.) along with other phrases that I regard as 
problematic, including “average socially necessary labour-time.” Critics are 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 




invited to challenge this choice, and to argue, if they like, that Marx’s 
language is indispensable to his logic.  But I see matters differently.  The 
power of Marx’s argument lies in his reasoning, not in his vocabulary.  And 
his reasoning is often obscured by this vocabulary. 
In several previous texts I have interpreted Capital with fewer 
linguistic innovations and at greater length.23 But the cause of clarity is better 
served by attention to Marx’s meaning than to his occasionally ill-considered 
terminology.  In what follows, to clarify my objections to Marx’s language 
and to shed further light on the basic issues at stake, I will lightly annotate a 
few key aspects of the summary above.  
  
“What Marx offers us, most fundamentally, is a theory of the 
commodity.” 
  
This is an indispensable point.   Countless conventional accounts 
call Marx’s framework a “theory of value” or a “labor theory of value.”  But 
when Marx read a book by Adolph Wagner, who held that the “cornerstone” 
of Marx’s system is his theory of value and exchange-value, Marx wrote that 
what “Herr Wagner forgets is that neither ‘value’ nor ‘exchange-value’ are 
subjects in my work, but rather the commodity.”24 This is not a pedantic 
quibble.  The whole of Capital, from start to finish, analyses “the world of 
commodities,” that is, the form of society in which wealth takes the form of 
commodities.   
Many expert critics, misled by the echoing and ramifying 
resonances of the word “value,” have inferred that Marx’s “theory of value” 
applies to something besides commodities – e.g., to aesthetic or moral 
values.  Many beginners have suspected the same thing.  But Marx, in fact 
used the concept of value solely to refer to the commodity’s second 
dimension.  Use and value are the commodity’s Janus faces, its yin and 
yang.  Value, in Marx’s sense, is found in commodities and nowhere else. 
  
“Early commodity exchange takes the form of barter, in which one 
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commodity trades for another.  Ultimately, as exchange becomes 
increasingly widespread, at least one commodity acquires the 
status of money and becomes acceptable in exchange for every 
other commodity.  Barter thus gives way to buying and selling.” 
  
The substantive intent of this passage is to trace the arc of 
commodity production from its origin in pre-monetary society to its zenith in 
the period of “generalized commodity production,” that is, in capitalist 
society.  But in making this point I have a terminological intent as well.   
Often, when Marx refers to the “commodity form of value,” he also mentions 
value’s money and capital forms. Carefully read, his point is clear and well 
argued; but his language is misleading since it suggests, to the unwary, that 
value has “forms” outside the commodity, and that money and capital are 
somehow outside the world of commodities.  
Actually, what Marx means here is simply that commodities take 
five principal forms: (1) ordinary commodities, which are produced to be 
sold; (2), the extraordinary commodity, money, which is “the universal 
equivalent commodity”; (3) the super commodity, capital, which consists of 
money invested in production; and, also, the unique commodities that 
capital purchases to initiate production, namely, (4) labor power and (5) 
means of production.   All five of these essential realities in capitalist society 
are forms of the commodity and hence (to that extent, and to that extent 
only) they are forms of value.25  
This taxonomy is also a chronology.  Once, Marx says, there were 
only ordinary commodities; when money evolved, a second kind of 
commodity had appeared; and now, in capitalist society, we have several 
kinds of commodities, which overlap and entwine in many ways.  
  
“Use and price are the most immediately obvious attributes of the 
commodity.”  
  
Marx opens the first chapter of Capital, “The Commodity,” with the 
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statement that commodities combine use-value and exchange-value.  
These two terms may be his least successful linguistic choices.  It’s 
understandable that he chose to use them.  The classical writings from 
which he learned the vocabulary of political economy in the first place (by 
Ricardo, Smith et al.) all relied on the phrases “use-value” and “exchange-
value.”  But each of these terms proved confusing to Marx’s readers from the 
very start.  
When Capital first appeared in 1867, Marx was frustrated to 
discover that many of his readers were unable to fathom the distinction 
between use-value and exchange-value.  He realized that the problem in 
part, was that these terms ne have the word ‘value’ in common.”26 Hence, for 
Herr Wagner, use-value and exchange-value are to be derived at once from 
the concept of value, not as with me, from a concretum, the commodity.”   
This simple problem has remained a never ending source of 
confusion.  Even careful readers often suspect that, somehow, “use-value” 
and “exchange value” must belong to the larger category “value.”  That 
suspicion, if allowed to bloom, can lead to a misreading of nearly every 
basic concept in Marx’s theory. The reality is that value and “use-value” (by 
which Marx simply means utility) are radical opposites.  They are at 
war.  Will hungry people eat, or will they starve for lack of money?  Marx 
wants people to eat. 
  
“How is it even possible for physically unlike things to trade as 
equivalents?   How does it happen that dissimilar products can 
have identical prices?  The answers to these questions, Marx, says, 
lie in practice – the fact that, in exchange, dissimilar things are 
‘forcibly equated.‘ They are ‘treated and regarded‘ as if they are alike 
– and, as a result, they function as equivalents.” 
  
The equivalence of commodities, in short, is entirely a function of 
social thought and action.  Marx’s theme of “treating and regarding” is 
seldom noticed but fundamental. 
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“Labour…is also complex. Marx says that the pivot, the very 
Springpunkt of his theory is the contention that the labour that 
enters into price calculations is different in principle from the labour 
that affects the product’s uses.”  
  
For Marx, the importance of this point is hard to overstate.  The 
word “value” had been central to political economy for centuries, in many 
languages. The notion that value is “embodied labour” had been the 
defining feature of the classical political economy of Ricardo and Smith.  All 
this was well known when Marx wrote Capital.  But Marx differs from all his 
predecessors by distinguishing abstract from concrete labour.  This is the 
novelty of his theory, Marx’s true originality; and it is also, in my opinion, his 
greatest strength. 
The commodity is not simply a useful product.  It is a product with a 
price as well as a use.  That duality is what distinguishes the commodity 
from a merely useful product, and it is a duality that everyone sees in every 
commodity. But beneath that daily reality, beneath the commodity’s surface 
duality, lies a deeper reality.  Usefulness is “clear as noonday” but price is 
complex.  Marx adopts the word “value” to characterize the complex 
essential reality lying beneath price – but the word value is, strictly speaking, 
unnecessary.  Marx’s defining point about value can be stated in four words: 
“value is abstract labour.” 
 Hence, the word value can be replaced with the phrase abstract 
labour. Value as defined by Marx is (quite literally) only abstract labour, the 
social side of the commodity.  Hence, the concept that we must understand, 
if we hope to understand Capital, is abstrakt Arbeit. 
This poses a considerable conceptual challenge, not least because 
the orthodox tradition defines Marx’s worldview as “materialist” in a very 
narrow way. The notion that labour inheres in value certainly sounds 
reassuringly materialist. But Marx upsets the apple cart by declaring that the 
commodity’s value is “purely social,” that it “contains not an atom of matter” 
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– and it is value, not use, that defines the commodity as a product with a 
price.   
Put very simply, abstract labour is not “labour” in the ordinary sense. 
Ricardo had assumed that the labour embodied in the commodity is the 
actual labour performed by specific individuals.  Marx contends, on the 
contrary, that exchange negates individual particularity, reducing all 
products and producers to equivalence in a zone of quantitative but not 
qualitative difference.   
Given this premise, the word “is” should be taken very seriously in 
the defining sentence “Value is abstract labour.”  Writers often say, on the 
contrary, that labour “creates” value or that labour is the “source” of 
value.  These phrases might sound inoffensive, but in fact they seriously 
misconstrue the point.  Value is constituted not by concrete labour but by 
the transformation of concrete labour into abstract labor.  This is an act of 
negation, of Aufhebung, which occurs not in production but in exchange.  
We need to be clear about this.  Products may be produced for 
sale, but, until they actually sell, the labour they contain remains entirely and 
only concrete.  Likewise, instances of concrete labour, which result in 
irreducibly particular products, only become “abstract” when the products 
they fashion are forcibly equated to other products.  Exchange is thus the 
action of abstraction which negates the concreteness of the commodity.  
Producers in exchange “abstract” from the differences that otherwise 
distinguish their products.  They attend only to the abstract equivalence of 
their products in the domain of price.   
This is the sense in which labour is actually rendered abstract, not 
merely in thought, but in practice. 
Another misreading that reveals a materialist bias is the notion that 
abstract labour is identical to labour-power.27 Marx gave this reading a 
certain surface plausibility in several passages when he said that labour-
power, before it realizes itself kinetically as labour, has a plenitude of 
possible uses.  In principle, until concrete labour actually occurs, each of 
these uses has a similar status in potentia.  This might seem to suggest that 
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the identity forced by exchange upon different products already exists, in 
nuce, in the range of possibilities inherent in labour-power. But there is a 
vast difference between potential labour (“labour-power”) and expended 
concrete labour which has been de-concretized by sale (counting socially, 
therefore as “abstract labour”).   
The possibilities latent in labour-power are, in Marx’s Hegelian 
phrases, presuppositions (Voraussetzungen) for commodity production and 
exchange.  In contrast, the concrete labours rendered abstract by sale are 
results (Resultate). Historically, though the profit-steered exercise of labour-
power for now typical, labour-power in the past has been realized more 
often in concrete use-values than in a forcibly equated “values.” 
Thinking in these terms is so novel, and often so counter-intuitive, 
that few expositors have found it easy to follow Marx’s argument.  Take the 
decisive opening of Marx’s section on “the dual character of the labor that 
appears in the commodity.”  This is the passage in which the defining word 
Springpunkt (pivot) appears for the first time.  In the 1867 first edition, this 
paragraph reads as follows:  
“Ursprünglich erschien uns die Waare als ein Zwieschlächtiges,  
     Gebrauchswerth und Tauschwerth.  Näher betrachtet wird sich  
     zeigen, dass auch die in der Waare enthaltene Arbeit       
     zwieschlächtig  ist.  Dieser Punkt, der von mir zuerst kritisch      
     entwickelt wurde, ist der Springpunkt, um den sich das       
     Verständniss der politischen  Oekonomie dreht.” 
 
In other words: “At first the commodity appears as contradictory 
duality of use-value and exchange-value.  Upon closer inspection, it will be 
seen that the labour in the commodity is also a contradictory duality.  This 
point, which I was the first to develop critically,28 is the pivot around which an 
understanding of political economy turns.” 
A Google Books search reveals that this brief defining paragraph 
has been quoted in full only once, by an anonymous reviewer in 1868.29 In 
striking contrast, the phrase “Marx’s theory of value” (and variations on this 
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phrase)30 appear in over 45,000 texts.  The same disparity appears when we 
examine the revised version of this paragraph that appeared in two later 
editions of Capital – the 1872 second edition (the last German edition that 
Marx edited himself) and the 1883 edition that Engels edited just months 
after Marx’s death.  Marx writes:   
“Ursprünglich erschien uns die Waare als ein Zwieschlächtiges, 
 Gebrauchswerth und Tauschwerth.  Später zeigte sich, dass auch die 
 Arbeit, soweit sie im Werth ausgedrückt ist, nicht mehr dieselben 
 Merkmale besitzt, die ihr als Erzeugerin von Gebrauchswerthen 
 zukommen. Diese zwieschlächtige Natur der in der Waare 
 enthaltenen Arbeit ist zuerst von mir kritisch nachgewiesen 
 worden.  Da dieser Punkt der Springpunkt ist, um den sich das 
 Verständniss der politischen Oekonomie dreht, soll er hier näher 
 beleuchtet werden.” 
 
In English: “At first the commodity appears as contradictory duality 
of use-value and exchange-value.  It later became clear that the labour 
expressed in the value of the commodity no longer possesses the same 
features as the labour that begets use-values.  This contradictory nature of 
the labour contained in the commodity I was the first to develop 
critically.  Since this point is the pivot around which understanding of the 
political economy revolves, it will be elucidated here." 
A Google Books search shows that, even though this paragraph 
has circulated far more widely than the original version, it has never 
previously been cited in full.  The full concluding sentence (“Da dieser Punkt 
der Springpunkt ist,” etc.) has been quoted only once, by the Swedish 
socialist G. F. Steffen in a paper entitled “Marx’s Introduction to His Value 
Theory” in the Sozialistische Monatshefte (1897).  The first English translation 
of this sentence, by Samuel Moore, has been cited only four times, and the 
standard current version by Ben Fowkes has been quoted in only five 
texts.31 Of those five quotations, only one (appears in my own dissertation) 
also cites the word Springpunkt.32 The French version of this sentence, which 
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appeared in 1872 in a translation edited by Marx, has been quoted by seven 
authors in toto.33  
Let’s pause briefly to consider the implication of this bibliographic 
exercise.  It seems, given the evidence, that relatively few authors have 
probed the granular detail of Marx’s dialectic of concrete and abstract 
labour.  The same implication springs from the wider Marxian literature.  
Lucio Colletti, who was one of the few writers to realize that value for Marx is 
a social status that results from treating labour as abstract, recoiled in alarm 
when he reached that conclusion.  Expecting to find a scientistic Marx á la 
Della Volpe,34 he was startled to realize that Marx was in fact a social realist, 
for whom value exists only as a function of alienated social practice.  Less 
insightfully, but with theological subtlety, Michel Henry analysed Marx’s 
concept of abstract labour with rare persistence – only to reach the fanciful 
conclusion that abstract labour is a social fiction and that what Capital truly 
reveals is the presence of Christ in the material reality underpinning value.35 
Suffice to say that remarkably few writers have clearly appreciated 
that Marx’s theory of the commodity is, from start to finish, social.  A similar 
deficit is clear with respect to another canonical term, “average socially 
necessary labour time.”  This phrase, too, has furrowed many brows.  That is 
why, in my summary, above, I tried to explain Marx’s point on this subject in 
plainer language. 
  
“What counts, in the market, is how long it takes to produce a 
commodity on average.  …  What matters…is the average amount of 
anonymous labour that goes into a typical product ….” 
  
“… the market ‘treats and regards’ each specific instance of 
concrete labour as if it were simply an average quantity of 
labour.  The act of trading the product for another product forcibly 
equates not only the two products but the labour that produced 
them.  The action of exchange entails abstraction from the 
particularities of the different kinds of labour that enter into the 
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products.  This is the sense in which commodity producing labour 
is abstract.  We are confronting an abstractness that appears only 
in price, only in the abstract quantity, the number, that comprises 
price.” 
  
“The total quantity of actual physical labour cannot change 
retroactively, but the total quantity of abstract labour often does just 
that.” 
  
These passages attempt to explain how the “magnitude” of value is 
determined.  When Marx himself tries to explain this, he complicates matters 
by invoking the phrase “average socially necessary labour time.”  Long 
experience has shown that readers find this phrase opaque.  One standard 
but mistaken inference is that Marx is talking about actual concrete labour 
time that society actually needs to survive and thrive.  But in reality he uses 
this term to designate abstract labour time – the average amount of time 
that is needed to successfully produce and sell a commodity. 
What matters in this context is not what people actually need to live 
and breathe, but rather the commodity owner’s need to sell the product.  In 
principle, calculations of “average socially necessary labour time” are just as 
vital to the commercial success of chemical weapons or fragmentation 
grenades as they would be to milk and honey.  The point of this calculation 
is to ensure that products sell, not that they enhance people’s lives. 
It should be noted, further, that the calculation of “average” labour 
time for the purpose of exchange differs from the calculation of concrete 
labour time for the purpose of meeting real human needs.  Society always 
requires a realistic sense of how much time it takes, on average, to make 
and share things of different kinds.  But that is simply a matter of the 
concrete time that is required to produce concrete products.  The “average 
socially necessary labour time” in a commodity is something very different – 
it consists of the average amount of abstract labour time that the seller of 
the product will realize in the form of money (or in other equivalent 
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commodities) once the sale is complete. 
If commodity sellers (who, today, are mainly capitalists) 
miscalculate this average, they will suffer financial losses.  To avoid that 
outcome, they need to know how much time is “needed socially” (that is, 
technically needed, given the present capacities of labor and machinery) to 
successfully sell their products. This is a concern, not for the society in toto, 
but for the seller – whose product may or may not have socially desirable 
uses. 
Ultimately, Marx’s thesis here concerns the two complementary 
ways in which labour is rendered abstract – in quality and quantity.  
Qualitatively, different forms of concrete labour are treated and regarded as 
if they were the same.  That is the sense in which abstract labour is the 
“substance” of value. But a quantitative abstraction takes place as well, 
namely, the equation of each product to some “average” quantity of 
undifferentiated labour. Calculations of “average socially necessary labour 
time” are thus the abstractions by which each commodity receives a 
quantitative identity.  This is their “magnitude of value.”  
In other words, labour is rendered abstract qualitatively (as “value”) 
and quantitatively (as “value-magnitude”).  These parallel abstractions 
always accompany one another in practice, since no commodity is ever 
without a price.  But conceptually they are distinct.  In principle, commodity 
exchange requires producers to (a) ignore the differences between their 
products and (b) calculate the respective quantities of “average labour” 
embodied in each.  Both of these actions are moments of a single act of 
exchange, and each embodies an interpenetrating form of abstraction.  That 
is what Marx hoped to convey by the awkward phrase “average socially 
necessary labour time.” 
  
“Marx is well aware that… people do not ordinarily see ‘abstract 
labour’ [or] perceive that commodities sell in proportion to the 
amount of average anonymous labour they contain.  … In 
developed commodity production, with money as the commodity 
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equivalent to all others, people see price.”  
  
“The essential reality… is the fact that concrete labour is treated and 
regarded as abstract.  The empirical reality…we see and 
calculate…is price.”  
  
“This is what Marx means when he calls price the ‘appearance 
form’ (Erscheinungsform) of abstract labor.” 
  
Substantively this is one of Marx’s most crucial and yet most difficult 
points.  The difficulty lies partly in the presentation, which is extraordinarily 
detailed and technical.  In my account of this point, above, I left aside his 
detailed elaboration of the transition from barter to money.  That explanation 
is important but it also clutters Marx’s point, namely, that products only 
count as commodities when they are treated as equivalents and that they 
are “treated” in this way only when people “regard” them as value-laden.  In 
other words, the practice that gives concrete products commercial 
equivalence is subjective as much as objective. 
Marxists often shy away from the notion of subjectivity, but Marx did 
not.  As he wrote in 1867 in the first edition of Capital, “The objectivity of 
human labour when it is abstract, without further content or qualities, is 
necessarily an abstract objectivity, a thing of thought (ein 
Gedankending).”36 In every edition of Capital, he calls “the value-form” 
(Werthform) a “thought-form” (Denkform).37 Readers should keep in mind 
that this is an entirely literal claim, not a metaphor.  The “value-form” is the 
form in which value appears in consciousness.   
Marx’s use of the word “form” to modify “value” has often puzzled 
commentators, many of whom have credited him with arcane 
meanings.  But in fact, Marx uses the phrase “appearance-form” 
(Erscheinungsform) to explain how abstract labour appears to buyers and 
sellers. How do producers see (envision, imagine) the value of the products 
they bring to the market?  This is their basic practical concern.  Their 
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thought processes on this subject are also generally practical.  Seldom, 
Marx says, do producers look at their products from the standpoint of theory 
and see them as units of abstract labour.  What they see, instead, is much 
simpler.  They see a coat, which is worth 20 yards of linen, or a basket, 
which is worth $15.  Value thus appears in immediate, practical form.  It 
takes this form in thought. 
With respect to labour-power – which is, Marx says, the commodity 
most people own and sell in capitalist society – the appearance form of 
value is the wage.  The wage too embodies a quantum of abstract labour, 
but the worker sees something more immediately obvious:  the wage as a 
sum of money.  That sum of money is the “form” taken by the value of labour 
power in the workers’ thoughts.   
The underlying reality, Marx says, is the “substratum” of abstract 
labour “hidden” beneath the surface of experience.  But this reality “must be 
discovered by science.  What appears in the market, in everyday thought, is 
simply the wage itself, which, like all Denkformen, appears in the mind’s 
eye.38 
Yet another complication is the fact that Marx treats the phrases 
“value-form” and “exchange-value” as synonyms.  This is not what readers 
usually think at the outset of Chapter 1, where he appears to use the term 
“exchange-value” to mean value per se.  This is what he plainly implies 
when he calls the commodity the unity of use-value and exchange-
value.  But quite eccentrically, Marx soon withdraws that implication: “When, 
at the start of this chapter, I said in the customary way that a commodity is 
both a use-value and an exchange value, this was, strictly speaking, false.”   
False in what way?  Marx explains.  Value, the second dimension of 
the commodity, only becomes visible when it acquires “its own unique 
appearance-form, which is,” he writes, “distinct from its natural form.  This 
appearance-form is exchange-value…”  The two phrases, in other words, are 
synonyms.  “Exchange-value” is just another way to say appearance-form of 
value.  Value appears to observers only in exchange, and hence “exchange 
value” is the form in which value appears to us.  “Once we know this,” Marx 
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says, a touch apologetically, “our manner of speaking does no harm; it 
serves, rather, as an abbreviation.”39  
But alas, the reality is that Marx’s indiscriminate use of synonyms 
has confused a great many readers.  He saw signs of this perplexity in the 
writings of Wagner and Rodbertus, for whom his concept of exchange-value 
proved to be a complete mystery.  To clarify this mystery, Marx quoted the 
very passage I just quoted in his commentary on Wagner’s book.  In this 
way he admits, yet again, that his first definition of the commodity was, 
“strictly speaking, false.”  This is remarkable.  But perhaps even more 
remarkable is the fact that (if Google is to be trusted) Marx remains, to this 
day, in his notes on Wagner, the only writer ever to cite this admission in 
print.40 A phrase that Marx called, “strictly speaking,” a mistake, has held 
unchallenged sway in the literature of commentary ever since. 
Exchange-value is no less confusing in Marx’s second primary 
usage.  This is when he treats “exchange value” as a synonym for the term 
“appearance-form of value.”  At best, that usage is redundant. But I contend 
that neither term, “exchange value” or “appearance-form of value,” is worth 
retaining.  If we simply call value what it is – abstract labour – the phrase 
“appearance-form of abstract labour” suffices to make Marx’s point without 
loss of meaning and without the distractions of his proliferating value 
vocabulary.  If we want to abbreviate that phrase, I suggest the term 
“price.”  That is, in fact, the form in which abstract labour appears in 
exchange. 
         Why did Marx use the phrase “exchange value”?  He could easily 
have said “price” instead, since, in modern society, the vast majority of 
“exchange values” do in fact take the form of prices.  Barter is now rare, and 
outside of exchange there are no “exchange values.” But Marx was probably 
moved to adopt the general term, “exchange value,” by the fact that 
commodities trade either for money or for other particular commodities.  If 
we assume that prices can only be monetary, then the word price is too 
narrow to capture barter as well as money exchange.  That seems to have 
been Marx’s reasoning.  But what I am proposing now is that we simplify 
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matters by treating “price” as a global category with two subsets – money 
price and barter price.  By that simple expedient we would remove the need 
for the redundant and confusing term “exchange-value.” 
  
“In pre-monetary barter … rather than seeing money price, people 
see what we can call barter price.  This is the price of the 
commodity in the form, not of money, but of another specific 
commodity, which Marx calls a ‘particular equivalent commodity’.” 
  
Where does this leave us?  If, as I am proposing, we retain only the 
word “value” from Marx’s original menu of value-terms, we can say that 
value, in substance, is abstract labour; that the quantity of abstract labour in 
any given commodity is the commodity’s “essential price”; and that essential 
price, raised or lowered by fluctuations of supply and demand, comprises 
“empirical price.” Empirical price, finally, is the “appearance-form” of value 
(i.e., the form in which abstract labour appears to buyers and sellers). 
  
“… in general in his language of ‘appearance,’ ‘representation,’ and 
‘appearance-forms,’ Marx is talking about one thing only – how 
abstract labour appears to people.” 
  
Marx’s vocabulary is inherently complex, since commodity 
exchange is inherently complex.  He was right to think that, to demystify 
commodity relations, we need a dialectical language of abstract labour and 
appearance-forms.  But we also need to learn from experience and 
streamline Marx’s otherwise confusing termini technici.  I therefore propose 
that we use three basic terms – abstract labour, essential price and 
empirical price – to clarify Marx’s intent, focus on what matters most (price 
versus use), and facilitate theoretical communication.  
Another terminological issue that deserves our attention is Marx’s 
seldom discussed distinction between the “relative” commodity – the one 
you produce and hope to sell – and the equivalent commodity – the one you 
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hope to receive in return.  Few writers have grasped that, in the 
paradigmatic exchange between the coat-maker (the tailor) and the linen 
maker (the weaver), Marx is portraying not just reified social relations 
between things but actual relations between individuals whose interactions 
occur through the medium of their products.  This particular exchange, in 
other words, relates the tailor and weaver, not just the coat and the 
linen.  And only in this exchange does value “appear” – to whom?  To the 
tailor and the weaver, each of whom sees the other’s product as the 
equivalent of their own.   
 
“The owner of the equivalent commodity is always the other party 
to the exchange.  Given this premise, the form in which the abstract 
labor in the coat appears to the tailor is plain.  It is, very simply, the 
weaver’s 20 yards of linen.” 
  
“In short, abstract labour always appears to the relative commodity 
owner in the form of the equivalent commodity.  That means that 
abstract labour always takes the form of price – either barter 
price…or money price...”  
  
We arrive now at the issue of commodity fetishism. When the 
product is not yet a commodity, it is not yet opaque and mysterious.  As a 
result of concrete labour, the product does not exceed our ordinary 
conceptual grasp.  It is easy to see that what we make springs from our own 
effort and imagination.  But when, in exchange, our concrete labour is 
rendered abstract, it becomes uncanny. The product as a commodity now 
seems to be animated by occult forces.  It escapes the event horizon of daily 
life and enters the sphere of “the market,” where, as in a hall of mirrors, the 
“value” of the product is reflected in the enumerated bodies of unlike 
equivalents.  Use now cedes its place as the defining feature of the product.  
The “ghostly objectivity” of price now covers the product like a social 
shadow. We become less the product’s creator than its vendor, hoping for 
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the market’s benediction.  
In the market, we represent our products in social relations 
between things.  Our concrete powers of creation now await validation in 
abstract relations of equivalence.  These concrete powers are suspended, 
held in abeyance, until the market “realizes” the commodity’s status as an 
exchangeable product.  All power now seems to rest with market forces 
beyond our control.  Will our products sell?  Will our labours count for 
something?  We await answers to those questions from impersonal forces 
which, it seems, inhere in price and in the market. 
  
“Price… seems to be intrinsic to the product itself.  It is certainly 
beyond our control.  Price is, in fact, the social truth of the 
commodity, a truth, independent of our personal wishes … which 
only exchange can reveal to us.” 
 
It is in this sense that our products, as commodities, have a “fetish 
character.”  
  
“…price is a kind of force field, enveloping the product and blocking 
our access to it.  We can only obtain the product’s use if we pay its 
price; and [the] consequence is that people go hungry for lack of 
money…  For Marx [this] is a travesty … What he wants, most 
fundamentally, is to roll back the price-side of the 
product.  Products with prices are products for sale; and Marx 
believes that people should share, not sell, what they make.” 
  
A Scientific Utopian? 
  
Marx’s radicalism is universally acknowledged, but it is misjudged nearly as 
often.  Thanks to his Stalinist and reformist epigones, who either embraced 
or resigned themselves to the expropriation of the peasantry and the 
exploitation of wage-earners, Marx is generally seen as a critic of capitalism 
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whose alternative was centralized planning and nationalized property.  The 
easily ascertained fact that he opposed statism and nationalism is routinely 
overlooked.  The shade of the Russian revolution, which is celebrating its 
centenary this year, has loomed large.  Marx is read by the “orthodox” 
through the prism of a centralist doctrine which owes its global circulation 
and prestige to the Russian state.  Similar in effect has been the statism of 
Social Democratic ruling parties in Germany, England and elsewhere.   
 Little noticed, amid the clamor of rival “Marxisms,” has been Marx’s 
case against value and commodification.  Unread or misread, Capital 
remains a message in a bottle, awaiting discovery.  The fact that, unlike 
Gray and Darimon, Marx wanted to decommodify products altogether – that 
he wanted them to shed their double character and revert to concrete 
usefulness alone – has been almost universally overlooked in traditional 
Marxism. 
When, in the turbulent 1960s, Isaac Deutscher returned to Capital 
after a 30-year hiatus, he was struck by the gulf between Marx’s original 
vision and the watered down thinking that had been credited to Marx in the 
intervening century. His acolytes had erred above all by positing the 
persistence of “the law of value” under so-called “socialism”; this, Deutscher 
now saw, was entirely contrary to the letter and spirit of Marx’s critique.  In 
his unpublished 1967 notes, Deutscher now stressed that “Marx pokes fun at 
Proudhon, who wanted…to have socialism based on exchange of 
commodities.”41 
 
[Marx] did not dream of Marxist economists, Soviet, Polish and 
Yugoslav, see for example Lange and [Lerner], who asserted that 
[these countries] have socialism based on both commodity 
exchange and money and so went even further in Utopia than 
Proudhon.42    
 
Thinkers like Lange accepted the fetishist premise that products must have 
prices; that value springs eternal, even under socialism.43  
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Deutscher also annotated a passage in which Marx pointed out 
that, since money is the most palpable and universal form of value, people 
who begin to grow disillusioned with capitalism are nevertheless still likely 
to seek solutions in the realm of money: “One or another kind of artful 
tinkering with money is then supposed to overcome the contradictions of 
which money is merely the perceptible appearance.”44   
This observation remains as true now as ever.  Radical writers like 
Hardt and Negri have pinned their hopes on new forms of finance,45 and the 
radical left party Syriza in Greece, which came to power in 2015, was fatally 
divided from the start by a debate over whether to return to the drachma or 
to retain the euro.46 The latter approach, as urged by Syriza’s leaders, has 
kept Greece mired in austerity.  But the alternative proposed by Syriza’s 
opposition also revolved around tinkering artfully with money.  That would 
not have been a viable long-term solution, either.47    
If Marx is right, the problem lies deeper.  The profit motive drives 
capital to amass an ever-growing surplus.  The fact that this takes the form 
of money is not incidental.  Money is not a neutral accounting tool, or an 
instrument of sane investment or humane resource distribution.  It is, in 
principle, first and foremost, the substance of profit, the object of the profit 
motive.  Money can be diverted to other uses only modestly.  In its major, 
systemic use, money is invested privately as capital to accumulate further 
capital.  Capital hires workers at wage rates low enough to yield profit – and 
when profit rates are no longer high enough to justify further investment, 
workers are left jobless.  The profit motive is private and self-interested, not 
self-sacrificing and public spirited. 
With this point in mind Deutscher cites a passage in the Grundrisse 
in which Marx concedes that attempts to shield capitalism from instability 
via bold monetary policies could, in fact, have transient successes.  But in 
such cases, “one [only] strikes a blow at the sack while aiming at the 
donkey…. As long as these attacks are directed against money as such, they 
are merely an attack on consequences whose causes remain unaffected: 
i.e., disturbance of the productive process…”48 
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What are the true causes of crisis and instability?  If Marx is right, 
falling rates of profit and industrial investment derive from the inner nature 
of commodity production, and hence solutions are not possible on the 
foundation of commodity relations.  In my opinion, many features of the 
global economic crisis that began in 2008 appear to justify this conclusion, 
or render it probable.49 If that is, in fact, correct, then “artful tinkering with 
money” and markets is precisely the Utopia that Marx says it is.  What 
people would conventionally call the utopian view is in fact realism – the 
conviction, as per the Grundrisse, that today’s privatized division of labor, 
which presupposes “the exchange of exchange values,” offers society less 
hope than the socialized division of labor, which would unite coworkers to 
produce cooperatively and consume equitably.  Real hope lies, not in 
buying and selling in the Waarenwelt, but in associating freely and sharing 
in the Produktenwelt.50 
That, at least, was Marx’s radical wish.  Most socialists today, styling 
themselves as realists, would call this wishful thinking.  Like Syriza they think 
that realism dictates accommodation with capitalism, which can be 
reformed but not transformed.  Marx’s outlook thus appears archaic to them, 
more akin to utopian socialism than to the scientific socialism claimed for 
Marxism by Engels.  But this misconstrues what Engels meant by 
science.  He took for granted that socialists pursue utopian goals, but he 
held that these goals can only be taken seriously if they are pursued by 
realistic means.  Utopian socialists like Owen and Fourier were not wrong to 
seek a classless society, but they were naïve about the means needed to 
achieve that goal.  They grasped neither the system blocking their way 
(capitalism) nor the forces (workers and farmers) that could move towards 
those goals realistically.  Science was needed, and Capital was a step on 
the path to that science. 
In 2016, we celebrated the quincentennial of Thomas More’s 
Utopia, which first appeared in Latin in 1516.51Utopia was both a source of 
historical information (often cited in Capital with respect to the expropriation 
of the English peasants) and a rhetorical challenge to money.  More did not 
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issue this challenge in the full-fledged anticommercial spirit which 
occasionally found expression in antiquity.52 His narrator, Raphael Hythloday, 
challenged money, not commerce per se.  Nor do we know whether More 
shared Hythloday’s views.  But these views were expressed forcefully and 
memorably.  
On the island of Utopia, Hythloday tells us, money is a thing of the 
past.  This is all to the good: “once the use of money was abolished, and 
together with it all greed for it, what a mass of troubles was cut away!”53 
Ralph Robynson, who translated Utopia into early modern English, gave 
Hytholday’s ensuing soliloquy an Elizabethan force and eloquence: 
  
“How great an occasion of wickedness and mischief is plucked up 
by the roots!  For who knoweth not, that fraud, theft, rapine, 
brawling, upheaval, strife, …contention, murder, treason, poisoning, 
which by daily punishments are rather revenged than refrained, do 
die when money dieth?  And also what fear, grief, care, labours, and 
vigils do perish even the very same moment that money 
perisheth?  Yea, poverty itself, …if money were gone, it also would 
decrease and vanish away.”54 
  
So strongly did Robynson feel this sentiment that he put words into 
Hythloday’s mouth that More had not written: “So easily might men get their 
living, if that same worthy princess, Lady Money, did not alone stop up the 
way between us and our living,” that “famine and pestilence,” “plague and 
penury,” would melt away.   
What prevents this from happening?  Traditional moral literature 
blames the auri sacra fames – “the accursed greed for gold.”55 Interestingly, 
Hythloday offers a more nuanced answer:  Hubris.56 What fuels the quest for 
gold is not simply self-absorbed avarice but, rather, the wish for proofs of 
superiority, as shown by the misery of the poor.  Hubris, “the prince and 
parent of all plagues,” Hythloday declares, “measures prosperity…by the 
disadvantages of others….” 
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“This infernal serpent, pervading the human heart, keeps men from 
reforming their lives, holding them back like a remora.”57 
  
In this striking contention Utopia takes us a step beyond Das 
Kapital, where Marx concerns himself less with the hubris of the profit 
motive than with the competitive pressure that forces capitalists to exploit 
workers (even when, like the factory owner Robert Owen, they find this 
distasteful).  But Marx was keenly aware of the accursed force of greed and 
hubris.  He often cited Utopia to document the avarice that drove lords and 
kings to expel farmers from the land by “grotesquely terroristic” means.58 And 
there are intriguing parallels between the literary structure of ancient Greek 
myths in which Hubris, by enraging Nemesis, provokes its own downfall, 
and Marx’s famous contention in the penultimate chapter of Capital that 
capitalist overreach provokes the “ever swelling resistance” of the 
oppressed classes and, ultimately, the “expropriation of the 
expropriators.”  But that’s a story for another occasion. 
 
A Final Word 
 
Anyone who accepts the thesis of this paper – that Marx’s critique of value is 
utopian in its implications – could easily regard that as simply another 
reason to dismiss Capital.  To readers who are so inclined, I offer these 
questions:  
Will the profit motive allow society to radically mitigate poverty and 
environmental degradation?   
In this age of austerity, falling wages and joblessness, is it likely that 
consumer demand will revive sustainably enough to prompt investors to 
turn from speculation to investment in manufacturing?  
 Is the business cycle our fate?  Is humanity condemned to 
alternating upturns and downturns that drive people into unemployment 
and destitution, as if every bout of good health required a matching bout of 
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If production for sale and profit does not, in fact, seem likely to solve 
our problems, we need an alternative.  That alternative is what Marx 
envisioned in Capital, 150 years ago, with an incisiveness that remains 
unique to this day. 
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translation by Stone, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, op. cit., pp. 
101f.  On Darimon, see the Grundrisse, translated by Martin Nicolaus, pp. 115-127. Marx’s 
critique of Proudhon began with Misère de la Philosophie (Paris: A. Frank, 1847) and 
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23 See especially Marx’s Capital Illustrated, op. cit.  I’ve written other papers as well with 
similar arguments but more conventional language – e.g., “Capitalism’s Future: Self-
Alienation, Self-Emancipation, and the Remaking of Critical Theory,” pp. 11-62 in 
Capitalism’s Future: Alienation, Emancipation and Critique, edited by Daniel Krier and Mark 
Worrell (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2016) and “Time is Still Money: Common Sense and 
Commodity Fetishism,” pp. 191-259 in Dean Wolfe Manders, The Hegemony of Common 
Sense (San Francisco: Looking Up Press, 2016). 
24 See Marx’s excerpt notes and comments, “Randglossen zu Adolph Wagner's Lehrbuch 
der politischen Ökonomie” in Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Werke, Bd. 19 [Berlin: Dietz, 1973], 
pp. 355-83 https://www.marxists.org/deutsch/archiv/marx-engels/1879/xx/wagner.htm.  A 
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27 Entire books have been based on this premise.  See, e.g., The Value Doctrine of Karl Marx 
(New York: King's Crown Press, 1943) by Albert G. A. Balz (a specialist in Spinoza, 
Descartes, and Hobbes), in which Balz grounds his reading of Marx in precisely this 
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28 Here Marx footnotes Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, op. cit 
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theory of value,” “Marx’s theory of value,” and “Marx’s labour theory of value.”  When I 
searched for the word Springpunkt along with the phrase “Marx’s theory of value,” the 
original mass of citations shrank to just a few texts, one of which is a paper of my own (“The 
Spectral Reality of Value,” Research in Political Economy, 19, 2001, pp. 47-66). Others whose 
texts discuss both terms include Patrick Murray, Michael Heinrich, and John Holloway. 
31 Engels recruited Marx’s friend, the physician Samuel Moore, to translate the opening 
chapters of Capital for the first English edition in 1887 (London: Swan Sonnenschein), 
which was based on the third German edition; Marx’s son-in-law Edward Aveling translated 
the later chapters.  For the version which is now standard (London: New Left Books, 1976) 
Ben Fowkes translated the whole of the fourth German edition.  
32 David Norman Smith, Authorities, Deities, and Commodities:  Classical Sociology and the 
Problem of Domination (Ph.D thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1988). 
33 “Comme l'économie politique pivote autour de ce point, il nous faut ici entrer dans de plus 
amples details.”  Two of the texts that cite this key sentence are by the philosopher Michel 
Henry, about whom see note 34, below. 
34 Colletti’s insights into Capital appeared in Marxism and Hegel (London: New Left Books, 
[1969] 1972) and From Rousseau to Lenin (New York: Monthly Review Press, [1969] 
1972).  His flight from Capital is narrated in Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The 
Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1984), pp. 444-51. 
35 Michel Henry’s detailed inquiry into value appears in his two-volume book Marx, tome I: 
une philosophie de la réalité, and Marx, tome II: une philosophie de l’économie (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1976).  The otherwise good English translation is so sharply abridged that 
Henry’s Christological premises are less apparent than in the original:  Marx: A Philosophy 
of Human Reality, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1983).  Excellent critiques are offered especially by Henry’s theological interlocutors – 
the Dominican Paul-Dominique Dognin, “Le ‘Marx’ de Michel Henry,” Revue Thomiste, 77 
(4), 1977, pp. 610-624; and the Jesuit Xavier Tilliette, “La christologie philosophique de 
Michel Henry,” Gregorianum 79 (2), 1998, pp. 369-379.  Tilliette, interestingly, criticizes Henry 
for refusing to accept Christ’s “two natures,” which leads him deny the commodity’s bi-
dimensionality as well.  For Henry, Christ is divine, not human; and since he says that 
Christ’s divinity resides in materiality, not sociality, Henry affirms and idealizes use-value 
(the material shell within which divinity dwells) but calls abstract labour a sheer 
fiction.  Tilliette objects, on Christological grounds, that Henry elaborates a single-nature 
(“monophysite”) theology rooted in a Docetic assertion of Christ’s illusory humanity.  I would 
add that he is equally guilty of a monophysite reading of the commodity.  
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36 “Gegenständlichkeit der menschlichen Arbeit, die selbst abstrakt ist, ohne weitere Qualität 
und Inhalt, ist nothwendig abstrakte Gegenständlichkeit, ein Gedankending” (Capital, 1867, 
op. cit., p. 17, italics in the original).  The key formula in this passage, “abstrakte 
Gegenständlichkeit, ein Gedankending,” appears rarely in Google Books. 
37 See Das Kapital, 1867, op. cit. (Anhang, “Die Werthform”), p. 772; Das Kapital, Aufl. 2 
(Hamburg: Otto Meissner, 1872), pp. 34-35; Le Capital, 1875, op. cit., p. 23 (“formes…de la 
pensée”), Das Kapital, Aufl. 3, edited by Engels (Hamburg: Otto Meissner, 1883), pp. 26-27; 
and Das Kapital, Aufl. 4, edited by Engels, (Hamburg: Otto Meissner, 1890), p. 25.  Hereafter I 
will cite these editions of Das Kapital by their dates.  All references are to Vol. 1, not because 
Vols. 2 & 3 depart from Vol. 1, but because that is where we find Marx’s ABCs. 
38 See Das Kapital, 1867, op. cit. (p. 529), Das Kapital, 1872, op. cit. (p. 563), Le Capital, 1875, 
op. cit. (p. 234, “formes phénoménales [reflété] dans l’entendement”), Das Kapital, 1883, op. 
cit. (p. 554), and Das Kapital, 1890, op. cit. (p. 541).  A Google Books search for the pivotal 
phrase in this passage -- “gang und gäbe Denkformen” – turned up just a dozen citations. 
39 Capital, 1976, op. cit., p. 152. 
40 This is the key phrase in the original German: “Wenn es im Eingang dieses Kapitels in der 
gang und gäben Mauier hiess: Die Waare ist Gebrauchswerth und Tauschwerth, so war 
diess, genau gesprochen, falsch.”  When I enter this sentence into Google, only a single 
instance appears – from Das Kapital itself (1872, op. cit., p. 36). The version by Fowkes 
(“When, at the beginning of this chapter, we said in the customary manner that a 
commodity is both a use-value and an exchange value, this was, strictly speaking, wrong,” 
p. 152) has been cited by just six authors (including Beverly Best, Peter Hudis, and C. J. 
Arthur).  Moore’s translation has been cited by just seven writers, including Geoffrey Pilling, 
Richard Westra, and Thomas Sekine. 
41 Deutscher’s notes on Capital and the Grundrisse were written in 1967, just months before 
his death.  His emphasis in these notes on the folly of attempting to ground “socialism” in 
commodity production was new for him.  In most of his published writings, including the 
third and final volume of his biography of Trotsky, The Prophet Outcast (New York: Oxford, 
1963) and in his Trevelyan lectures, The Unfinished Revolution (New York: Oxford,1967), 
Deutscher was guilty of arguing, inversely, that socialism is virtually synonymous with 
nationalized property.  That position, too, was very far from Marx and classical Marxism, as 
he explained in his discussion of “primitive socialist accumulation” in The Prophet Outcast. 
42 Tamara Deutscher was kind enough to share these notes with me in the 1970s.  The cited 
passage, on pp. 2-3, is drawn from p. 151 in ‘the Grundrisse;’ that is, the Grundrisse der Kritik 
der politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf) 1857-1858 (Moscow: Verlag für Fremdsprachige 
Literatur, 1939). 
43 Market socialists share with Stalinists the thesis that “the law of value” regulates (and 
should regulate) socialist societies.  One corollary of this thesis for societies of the Stalinist 
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type is that premise labour-power remains a commodity for the single-party state – which 
acts, in effect, as the universal equivalent employer.  That would make the class 
relationship between state capital and labour a very sensitive matter.  Interestingly, in 
China, when it was announced in 2009 that a musical version of Das Kapital would be 
staged, a top market strategist voiced skepticism.  “To tell you the truth,” Qin Quanyao said, 
the play will have to “pick away at the original Marx until there's nothing left…of the tone in 
which Das Kapital is written, that capitalists are the keepers of illegal jails, that workers are 
oppressed.”  Given the sharp uptick in labour disputes provoked by the state’s “market 
reforms” after the 2008 recession, Qin added, “There is no way that anyone would be 
allowed to write something that is truly Marxist in today's China.  That would mean the 
government was subverting itself.”  Cited by Ding Xiao, “Theater producers in Shanghai are 
getting ready to cast a new musical based on Karl Marx's seminal work, Das Kapital,” 
March 26, 2009; 
www.rfa.org/english/news/china/marx03262009140458.html/download_as_text 
44 Marx, Grundrisse:  Foundations for the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), 
translated by Martin Nicolaus (London: Pelican Books in association with New Left Review, 
1973), p. 240. 
45 See my “Review of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth” in the International 
Journal of Comparative Sociology, 54 (1), February, 2013: pp. 83-85. 
46 See my paper “Demand the Impossible: Greece, the Eurozone, and the Failure of the 
Utopian Imagination” (pp. 195-227) in The Social Ontology of Capitalism, edited by Daniel 
Krier and Mark Worrell (London & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
47 See my paper “Outrageous Fortune:  Further Reflections on Austerity, Resistance, and the 
Utopian Imagination” (pp. 228-234) in The Social Ontology of Capitalism, op. cit. 
48 This citation is blends Marx’s original with the Nicolaus translation, op. cit, p. 240, and 
Deutscher’s translation, op. cit., p. 3. 
49 I argue this case in my epilogue, “The Crash and After,” in Marx’s Capital Illustrated, op. cit., 
2014; and in “Mapping the Great Recession: A Reader’s Guide to the First Crisis of 21st-
Century Capitalism,” pp. 577-583 in New Political Science, 34 (4), 2011.  See also my Piketty 
papers, cited above, and the sources cited in all these papers. 
50 Deutscher’s notes, op. cit., p. 2. 
51 Thomas More, Libellus vere aureus nec minus salutaris quam festivus de optimo reip 
[ublicæ] statu, deq [ue] noua Insula Vtopia (Louvain: Thierry Martens, 1516). 
52 See, on the communal philosophical heritage that culminated in the writings of More’s 
friend Erasmus, Kathy Eden, Friends Hold All Things in Common: Tradition, Intellectual 
Property, and the Adages of Erasmus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); and cf. 
Marie Louise Berneri, Journey through Utopia (London: Routledge & Paul, 1950). 
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53 Thomas More, Utopia, translated by Clarence Miller (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2001), p. 132. 
54 Thomas More, A fruteful and pleasaunt worke of the beste state of a publyque weale, and 
of the newe yle called Vtopia, translated by Ralph Robynson (London: Abraham Vele, 1551), 
pp. 162-63.  I’ve modernized the spelling in places and, when Robynson’s English is 
unintelligibly archaic (e.g. using “watchings” for vigils), I insert terms drawn from More’s 
1516 Latin edition, Libellus vere aureus, op. cit., p. 159. 
55 Max Weber contrasts what Virgil called the auri sacra fames to the spirit of modern 
capitalism in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons 
(London & New York: Routledge, [1904-05], 2001).  The capitalist spirit is avarice which has 
been turned into its opposite, so that, instead of fueling a passionate quest for personal 
wealth, it is transmuted into the restrained, rational pursuit of what Weber characterizes as 
an irrational infinity for the benefit of the immortal enterprise.  On this, see my paper 
“Charisma and the Spirit of Capitalism,” pp. 67-116 in The Anthem Companion to Max 
Weber, edited by Alan Sica (London & New York: Anthem Press). 
56 More’s term here, superbia (see Libellus vere aureus, op. cit., p. 160), is the classical Latin 
equivalent for the Greek hybris.  More’s English translators usually render superbia as pride. 
57 In the cited passage, save for the word “remora” (which is from More’s original Latin, op. 
cit., p. 160), this is Miller’s translation (op. cit., p. 133).  Miller rendered “remora” colloquially 
as suckfish. 
58 Marx’s references to Utopia, in the 1976 translation of Capital, op. cit., appear on pp. 879-
880 and 898.  He indicts the “grotesquely terroristic” measures taken against the peasantry 
on p. 899. 
